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Courts, tribunals and 
ombudsmen   I
by Julian Farrand QC
Julian Farrand, the Pensions Ombudsman, considers the arguments 
for and against the different dispute resolution bodies. In Part I of 
his two-part article, he compares the roles and practice of tribunals 
and ombudsmen.
T he title ot this article not only lacks explanatory focus but also suggests an impossible scope of subject matter. The true intention, however, is to concentrate upon 
critical distinctions between three sorts ot dispute resolution 
bodies. More precisely, however, what will be elaborated are: 
first (in Part I), competitive comparisons between tribunals and 
ombudsmen and secondly (in Part II, to follow in the next 
issue), perceived tensions between the courts and ombudsmen. 
Even more precisely, the former will include special reference to 
the creation of the original Pensions Ombudsman whilst the 
latter will be derived entirely from personal (and often 
unfortunate) experiences with appeals against determinations of 
the present Pensions Ombudsman.
TRIBUNALS V OMBUDSMEN
Origins
Ombudsmen schemes developed not just because of 
dissatisfaction with the authorities or industries to which they 
relate but basically because of the limitations on litigation in the 
courts. Not only was redress for injustice caused by 
maladministration wanting and wanted (see, e.g. per Schieman 
J in R v Knowsky MBC ex pane Maauire (1992) 90 LGR 653 at pp. 
664 5: ' ... the applicants' claims fail. They fail because we do 
not have in our law a general right to damages for 
maladministration.'), but there was also a wish 'to provide a 
quick, inexpensive and informal means of settling complaints 
and disputes ... especially where an individual or a small group 
of individuals ... find themselves in conflict with [bodies] who 
have large resources (per Robert Walker J in Westminster CC v 
Hayn-ood (and Pensions Ombudsman) [1998] Ch 377 at p. 387 who 
added, however, that the Ombudsman's 'task in delivering rapid, 
unlegalistic justice, without cutting too many legal corners, is a 
dauntingly difficult one'). Thus the comment to a fairly recently- 
reported decision read:
'This case is a testament to the wisdom of the Occupational Pensions 
Board recommendation that cases involving pensions should not be dealt 
with by Chancery barristers and Chancery courts. The sheer length of
this judgment, with the innumerable rejerences to dog-Latin and 
obsolete and ancient case-law is a reminder of sledgehammers and nuts. 
The hope must be that the new' Pensions Ombudsman (with tribunal 
powers) will not reinvent Chancery.' (Alettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v 
Evans [1990] PLR9 at 58 (Warner J))
So, speaking generally, the National Consumer Council 
(NCC) has explained:
'Ombudsmen schemes are a relatively new means of providing 
consumers with access to redress against a wide range of public and 
private organisations. They are intended to be an independent and 
accessible wayjor consumers to resolve disputes without needing the help 
of a lawyer or going to court.' (Report on Ombudsman Services, 
Consumers' Views of the Office of the Building Societies 
Ombudsmen and the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, June 
1993).
Tribunal systems had already developed for very similar 
reasons. According to the Franks Committee:
'... tribunals have certain characteristics which often give them 
advantages over the courts. These are cheapness, accessibility, freedom 
from technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of their particular 
subject. It is no doubt because oj these advantages that Parliament, 
once it has decided that certain decisions ought not to be made by 
normal executive or departmental processes, often entrusts them to 
tribunals rather than to the ordinary courts.' (Report of the 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries 1957 
Cmnd 218).
As an example, rent tribunals were set up in response to a 
report recommending this because tenants had 'a great dread of 
ever going to court to get a decision' (Interdepartmental 
Committee on Rent Control, 1945 Cmd 6621).
The Franks Committee was not onlv concerned tor 
consumers but added a still topical point (at para. 39):
'Moreover, if all decisions arising Jrom new legislation were 
automatically vested in the ordinary courts the judiciar\- would by now 
have been grossly overburdened.'
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Reference was made to evidence from the Permanent Secretary 
to the Lord Chancellor that, without tribunals, a large number of 
additional judges would have to be created, diluting the quality of 
the Bench, so ' ... I believe, with others, that the system of 
administrative tribunals as it has grown up in this country has 
positively contributed to the preservation of our ordinary judicial 
system.' Of course ombudsmen also, like other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution, similarly benefit the judiciary, as 
well as consumers, whilst incidentally avoiding legal aid.
Definitions
Since ombudsmen and tribunals exist for essentially similar 
reasons, do their names mean something different? Dictionary 
definitions appear of little assistance: according to the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English (9th ed., 1995) the word 
'ombudsman' means 'an official appointed by a government to 
investigate individuals' complaints against public authorities etc. 
[Swedish, = legal representative]'. Although appropriate to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and the Local 
Authorities and other public sector ombudsmen, this definition 
excludes the private sector ombudsmen schemes (not to 
mention hybrid schemes such as that lor legal services or even 
pensions). In reality, the word 'ombudsman' carries no precise 
meaning and its use serves to disguise differences of substance 
and significance between the various schemes. The constitution, 
terms of reference and powers of each should be scrutinised 
with any assumptions of identity and consistency abandoned. 
Nevertheless, to combat misuse of the word 'ombudsman', the 
British and Irish Ombudsman Association has been established, 
its primary objects being to:
'(a) encourage, develop and safeguard the role and title oj 
Ombudsmen in both the public and private sectors;
(b) define, publish and keep under review criteria jor the recognition 
oj Ombudsman offices by the Association (attached as Schedule 1 );
(c) accord recognition to those persons or offices in the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland who satisfy the defined criteria for recognition;'
(Rules and Criteria approved at AGM, 14 May 1997; emphasis 
added).
ACCESSIBLE FOR CONSUMERS
'Ombudsmen schemes are a relatively new means of providing consumers 
with access to redress against a wide range of public and private 
organisations. They are intended to be an independent and accessible 
way for consumers to resolve disputes without needing the help of a 
lawyer or going to court. ' (Report on Ombudsman Services, 
Consumers' Views of the Office of the Building Societies 
Ombudsmen and the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, June 
1993).
The schedule referred to first states that the core role of an 
ombudsman is to investigate and (in ordinary language) decide 
complaints and then proceeds:
'The term 'Ombudsman' should only be used if four key criteria are 
met. Those criteria are independence of the Ombudsman from those 
whom the Ombudsman has the power to investigate; effectiveness; 
fairness and public accountability. ' (British and Irish Ombudsman 
Association, Rules and citeria, May 1997)
Some 22 schemes (including the Pensions Ombudsman) have 
satisfied the criteria and become 'voting' members of the 
Association. Unfortunately for English usage, not all of these voting 
members are actually called 'ombudsman'   there is not only the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (who does use the 
magic word) but also, for example, the Police Complaints Authority 
  but a number of schemes using the word 'ombudsman' have been 
held not to satisfy- the criteria. Incidentally, as to criteria, the 
Council on Tribunals has recently stated:
'It is clear to us that, since tribunals are established to offer a form of 
redress, mostly in disputes between the citizen and the State, the 
principal hallmark of any tribunal is that it must be independent. 
Equally important, it must be perceived as such. That means that the 
tribunal should be enabled to reach decisions according to law without 
pressure either from the body or person whose decision is being appealed, 
or from anyone else.'
(Report on Tribunals, their Organisation and Independence, 
1997 Cm 3744).
Accordingly, very many tribunals could certainly meet the key 
criteria and might, perhaps, think of joining the Ombudsman 
Association.
The word 'tribunal' is also imprecisely defined in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary:
' 1 Brit, a board appointed to adjudicate in some matter, esp. one 
appointed by the government to investigate a matter of public concern. 
2 a court of justice. 3 a seat or bench for a judge or judges. 4 a a 
place of judgement, b judicial authority (the tribunal of public 
opinion). [French tribunal or Latin tribunus ...].'
Nor does the word enjoy any precise legal definition. 'The word 
is ambiguous, because it has not, like 'court', any ascertainable 
meaning in English law.' (per Fry LJ in Royal Aquarium v Parkinson 
[1892] 1 QB 431). But a tribunal may be a 'court', albeit an 
inferior one (see Peach Grey &^Co v Sommers [ 1995] 2 All ER 513 per 
Rose LJ at pp. 519 520 as to contempt of court provisions 
covering an employment tribunal and/or a solicitors' disciplinary 
tribunal). Nevertheless there is now a Council on Tribunals with 
supervisory functions; these do not depend upon any statutory 
definition of 'tribunal' but instead there is a list of tribunals within 
the Council's jurisdiction (see now the Tribunals and Enquiries Act 
1992 Schedule). Not only does the list leave out some tribunals 
so-called (especially domestic/disciplinary and arbitral tribunals) 
but it also includes a number that are not so-called, one example 
being the Pensions Ombudsman.
Pensions Ombudsman and/or Tribunal
The role was created with careful nomenclature by statute in 
1990:
'For the purpose of conducting investigations in accordance with this 
Part or any corresponding legislation having effect in Northern Ireland 
there shall be a commissioner to be known as the Pensions 
Ombudsman. '
(see now Pension Schemes Act 1993, s. 145(1) consolidating 
provisions introduced by the Social Security Act 1990). The 
immediate impetus was a report by the Occupational Pensions 
Board (OPB) in 1989 (Protecting Pensions   Safeguarding Benefits in 
a Changing Environment, 1989 Cm 573) which recommended,
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inter alia, 'The setting up of a body to adjudicate in disputes 
between the individual and a pension scheme or provider which 
could not be resolved ... ' in effect by explanation and 
conciliation (13.1). The OPB observed:
'respondents who saw such a need mainly refer to the fact that 
ultimately there was no recourse in a dispute except to the High Court, 
which was not a realistic possibility in most cases. Another point made 
was that an adjudicating body needed to be expert in pension matters in 
order to deal expeditiously with the pension problems.' (para 13.3)
TRIBUNALS' ADVANTAGES
'... tribunals have certain characteristics which often give them 
advantages over the courts. These are cheapness, accessibility, freedom 
from technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of their particular 
subject. It is no doubt because of these advantages that Parliament, 
once it has decided that certain decisions ought not to be made by 
normal executive or departmental processes, often entrusts them to 
tribunals rather than to the ordinary courts.' (Report ol the 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries 1957 
Cmnd218)
However, the OPB's recommendation was actually anti an 
ombudsman, dismissive of any arbitration procedure and 
strongly pro a pensions tribunal (see para. 13.11  13.17).
Nevertheless, fortunately for my employment prospects, the 
government's response was in favour of an ombudsman. In a 
speech to the Society ol Pension Consultants on 7 November 
1989, Mr Tony Newton, the minister concerned, said (see SPC
News No 6):
'My view is that we should concentrate the new sendee on the types of 
problem that individuals, rather than schemes, can face. Disputes 
involving trustees, concerning large sums of money, are likely to end up 
in the courts in any case. That is not really our concern here. I believe 
therefore that the Ombudsman concept, which has become well- 
established and well-respected, is the right one. There are clear parallels 
with other Ombudsmen who adjudicate between individuals and large 
organisations. In the financial sector I am thinking particularly of the 
Banking and the Building Societies Ombudsmen. It is an adaptable 
concept that can be tailor-made to suit the particular characteristics of a 
certain situation, or industry.'
So the Social Security Bill was introduced to Parliament giving 
effect to this view, an amendment proposing both an 
Ombudsman and a tribunal being rejected by another relevant 
minister: (see Gillian Shephard, Hansard, 22 February 1990, 
Standing Committee G, col. 245 and 246).
Influential others were also opposed to an ombudsman. In 
particular the Council on Tribunals was at best critical: in its 
Annual Report for 1989-1990, it commented (para. 2.47 and 
2.52) as follows:
'2.47 When we examined the provisions in the Bill relating to the 
Pensions Ombudsman, we found that, in addition to his function of 
investigating complaints  
  he was to have the function of determining disputes of fact 
and law
  he could give directions in pursuit of the determinations
  the determinations were to be final and binding on those 
concerned
  determinations or directions would be enforceable in the 
County Court
  there would be appeals on points of law relating to 
determinations or directions
  procedural rules were contemplated lor the conduct of the 
investigation ol disputes.
We pointed out to the department that most of these features were 
characteristic of tribunals under our supervision, while none were to be 
found in existing statutory ombudsmen. What in effect had been created 
by the proposals in the Bill was, therefore, a tribunal in all but name, 
with certain additional functions of investigation of complaints 
characteristic of some true ombudsmen. We therefore took the view that 
the Pensions Ombudsman, when exercising his function of determining 
disputes offact and law, should be subject to our supervision. We also 
urged the abandonment of the, in our view, misleading nomenclature of 
'ombudsman', which in the circumstances could only be regarded as 
inappropriate and anomalous, and an attempt to persuade the public 
that what was being created was something other and more attractive 
than it was.
2.52 For the foregoing reasons, we consider the Pensions 
Ombudsman to be a novel and anomalous constitutional innovation. 
While we welcome the fact that, in exercise of the function of dispute 
investigation, the Ombudsman will be a tribunal falling under our 
supervision, we believe that this misleadingly-named body should not be 
replicated elsewhere.'
Thus it was no surprise that the very existence ot a pensions 
ombudsman was critically re-examined in submissions to the 
Pension Law Review (PLR) Committee (set up in the wake of the 
Maxwell scandal). The Committee reported in 1993 and after 
recording that the Council on Tribunals had reiterated its 
criticism proceeded:
'The Ombudsman and tribunals
4.13.40 For cases not resolved by OPAS we have considered three 
alternative forms of tribunal: the industrial tribunal, a new Pensions 
Tribunal and retention of the existing ombudsman system.
4.13.41 We do not consider that the industrial tribunal would be a 
suitable forum for individual pensions disputes. Pensions law is a 
specialist area and the resolution of individual pensions disputes requires 
a tribunal whose expertise is focused on that area. Moreover, a high 
proportion of disputes are between ex-employees and their former 
employers or between scheme members and an employer or pension 
scheme with which they have never had a direct relationship.
4.13.42 We have also considered whether to recommend that a 
tribunal be set up in place of the Pensions Ombudsman but we have not 
been persuaded by arguments in favour of a change of this sort. Whilst 
a tribunal is less formal than a court, creating a tribunal for pensions 
disputes would still involve some of the elements that lay people find 
daunting: oral evidence, and an adversarial procedure, in which the 
protagonists confront each other and ask questions whilst the tribunal 
listens to the evidence, as opposed to the inquisitorial approach used by 
the Ombudsman, who investigates the facts and then decides on the 
basis of them. The Ombudsman's office has only been in place for a 
short time, during which it has established a good working relationship 
with OPAS and has investigated a number of cases in considerable detail 
and with great persistence. We therefore prefer to sec changes
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implemented not by replacing the Ombudsman with a Pensions Tribunal 
but by introducing a series of rather smaller changes in the operation oj 
existing institutions.'
Accordingly, the PLR Committee concluded, happily so far as 
I am concerned, with the following recommendation:o
'150 The Ombudsman should not be replaced by a tribunal. Instead 
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman should be extended to include 
disputes between the employer and the trustees or among the trustees 
themselves.'
This recommendation was accepted by the government 
(White Paper 1994) not only without reservation but with the 
encouraging addition:
'Means of extending the Pensions Ombudsman's jurisdiction to 
collective disputes are also being explored.'
The Council on Tribunals remained unenthusiastic. In its 
Annual Report for 1993-1994 it commented (para. 2.132):
'We agree that the Pensions Ombudsman's office has achieved much 
in its short existence. However, we emphatically disagree with the 
Report's statement that, whilst a tribunal is lessjormal than a court, 
the creation of a tribunal for pensions disputes would still involve some 
oj the elements that lay people find daunting, notably oral evidence and 
an adversarial procedure. The giving of oral evidence which can be tested 
by questioning seems to us to be fundamental to resolving disputes of 
fact and law before any tribunal, including, we would say, the Pensions 
Ombudsman. But there is no reason why this should necessarily lead to 
an adversarial procedure. Many tribunals manage to combine adversarial 
and inquisitorial techniques. This is something that we encourage in 
suitable cases. The PLRC Report rightly stated that the proceduresJor 
resolving disputes needed to be fair, accessible, expeditious, inexpensive 
and easily understood. It seems to us that those are precisely the 
qualities which should characterise tribunals.'
The Council's somewhat ominous conclusion was (para. 
2.136):
'We regret the decision not to establish a specialist pensions tribunal. 
However, we shall take a keen interest in the enhanced role of the 
Pensions Ombudsman.'
The PLR Committee's report led to a Pensions Bill and, 
almost inevitably, in Parliamentary debates the ombudsman's 
role came under renewed attack, opposition forces favouring the 
tribunal idea. The ministerial defence proved effective (although 
in certain initial respects he deceived the House):
'Mr Arbuthnot: The ombudsman is an experienced, highly- 
qualified and distinguished lawyer. He embodies the considerable 
expertise that we need in a difficult subject. He has great personal 
qualities, but he is also supported by an experienced team. The collective 
knowledge of the team rejlects a vast array of expertise in different 
aspects of pension law. The ombudsman and his team may obtain advice 
from anyone who can help. He can refer any question of law to the 
High Court.
The ombudsman offers a specialist service for resolving disputes in 
pension cases. He has the same powers as the courts to require 
information and to examine witnesses. During the short time that the 
office has existed, the ombudsman has proved to be a success. Not only 
the government, but the industry- and those who have approached the 
ombudsman to resolve a dispute hold that view.' (Parliamentary 
Debates Official Report, Pensions Bill [Lords] - 20 June 1995).
In the result the ombudsman's role was not only triumphantly 
confirmed but significantly extended.
Interestingly, in its last (literally) report in 1997, the 
Occupational Pensions Board included this passage:
'Dispute resolution
The attention of the Committee was drawn to what the Board had 
recommended on this subject in its 1989 Report. At that time the 
Board had concluded that a pensions tribunal would be the best means 
for dealing with disputes between scheme participants, employers, 
trustees and members. The Government had taken a different stance and 
in subsequent legislation had made provision for the appointment of a 
Pensions Ombudsman to take on this task. The Board, whilst 
recognising the good and influential work done by the Pensions 
Ombudsman, considered that his role was too narrow and continued to 
believe that there was a strong case for establishing a pensions tribunal 
system. In the Board's view, such a body might provide an effective 
method for resolving conflicts which fell outside the existing authority of 
the Pensions Ombudsman, for example, in- the case of group conflicts or 
where there were disputes between trustees.'
CRITERIA
'The term 'Ombudsman' should only be used if four key criteria are 
met. Those criteria are independence of the Ombudsman from those 
whom the Ombudsman has the power to investigate; effectiveness; 
jairness and public accountability.' (British and Irish Ombudsman 
Association, Rules and Criteria, May 1997)
Comparisons
Semantically speaking, ombudsmen schemes and tribunal 
systems may be difficult to distinguish, especially since an 
'ombudsman' might involve a committee of three or more 
persons, whilst many tribunals in fact consist of one person. But 
to weigh the merits, a traditional   not to say simplistic   start 
must be made. Accordingly, the contest is between three- 
member tribunals conducting hearings, more or less 
adversarially, and deciding on the basis of the parties' oral 
representations and evidence, against a one-person ombudsman 
heading a team of investigators considering more or less 
inquisitorially the parties' written representations and evidence 
and deciding in the light of all relevant and discoverable 
information. On this basis, certain points of substance may be 
submitted.
(1) The fact that an ombudsman scheme depends on the 
judgment of one person may be perceived as dangerous: 
some ombudsmen may not possess the wisdom of 
Solomon or even the patience of Job (while the wrath of 
Jehovah seems easier to achieve). With tribunals, not only 
arc three heads better than one, but the wing members 
may import personal expertise and/or indirectlv be 
representative of the parties, e.g. employers (typically a 
magistrate) or employees (typically a trades unionist). 
Against this however should be noted a growing tendency 
to dispense with lay members and to enable cases to be 
dealt with by a single tribunal member (see Council on 
Tribunals, Annual Report 1998/99, p. 2, expressing 
concern).
(2) An ombudsman will emplov proactive professional 
assistants, qualified to research the facts and law, question
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the parties and witnesses, discover documents, advise on 
detail and issues and draft submissions and provisional 
decisions. Tribunals have civil service clerks.
(3) An ombudsman's inquisitorial role extends beyond 
investigating the facts by questioning the parties to 
instructing independent experts and consultants such as 
doctors, surveyors or actuaries. Whilst a tribunal chairman 
and members may put questions at hearings going beyond 
what the parties submit, and call tor further information or 
other documents, this is not properly inquisitorial. Indeed, 
a leading authority has pronounced:
Vt A? ^unJamenta/ fAaf (Ac pmcc&irc Aejore a friAuna/, AAe fAaf in a 
court oj /aw, sAou/d" Ae adversary (sic^ and" not inquisitorial TAe 
triAuna/ sAou/d" Aaye AofA sid"es o^tAe cdse presented" to if and" sAou/d" 
judge between tAem, witAouf itse/^ Aaring to cond"ucr an inquiry o^ its 
own motion, enter into tAe confrowersy, dnd" ca//^#r eyid"ence^or or 
dgainsf eifAer party. Jjfif a//ows itse/^to Aecome inm/yed" in fAe 
investigation and" argument, parties wi// ^uicA/^' /ose conAJence in its 
imparfia/ify, Aoweyerjair mind"ed" if may Ae.' (Wade & Forsyth 
AJminisfratiye law, 7th ed. at p. 931).
What this says about confidence in ombudsmen I hate to 
think, and at least one tribunal is instructed by statute to 
investigate (see financia/ Services /let 1986, s. 98; also Pension 
ScAemesAct 1993, s. 146(2)).
(4) Ombudsmen offer advisory services and attempt 
conciliation and mediation before finally resolving 
complaints and disputes by a determination. Tribunals do 
not.
(5) Ombudsmen comparatively rarely hold oral hearings, 
deciding instead 'off the papers'. One justification may be 
that otherwise 'the level playing field' between 
complainant and authorities/industry could become 
unbalanced by heavy legal representation. Tribunals almost 
always hold oral hearings, which may be seen as dauntingly 
court-like (e.g. Employment or Leasehold Valuation 
Tribunals). However, although submissions as to law or the 
implications of undisputed facts may be satisfactorily 
considered after exchange of written statements, disputed 
facts invoking conflicting evidence may be impossible to 
resolve satisfactorily without oral testimony and cross- 
examination. Indeed tribunals may already be under a legal 
duty to give oral hearings (ibid., at p. 933) as also may be 
some ombudsmen by virtue of art. 6(1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights ando
Fundamental Freedoms (1950): 'In the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing ... \ Enshrined now in the Human 
AigAts Act 1998, presumably this article will prove to be 
more prayed-in-aid by non-humans, such as p/c employers 
and insurers (italics supplied).
(6) The ombudsman, both personally and through his staff, not 
only controls and directs proceedings from the outset and 
throughout, but also participates by virtue of his 
investigatory/inquisitorial role. Tribunals of three tend to 
be appointed ad hoc from a panel of members for already 
listed hearings, receiving the papers only shortly in 
advance. Opportunities for pre-trial review or other 
preparatory intervention are limited for a tribunal but may
be undertaken, purportedly on its behalf, where there is a 
presidential system (supported in other respects by the 
Council on Tribunals: Report 1997 Cm 3744).
(7) One ombudsman with an efficient memory or cross- 
referencing system can ensure appropriate consistency in 
decision making. \^rious tribunals with different members 
may fail, inadvertently or deliberately, to achieve such 
consistency (hence the Council on Tribunals' support for 
presidential systems, sec above).
(8) Ombudsmen embrace accountability to the public as well 
as to their own authorities or industry, especially through 
explanatory annual reports, but also by themselves 
reporting significant decisions (even if digested and 
anonymised). Tribunal hearings arc open to the public in 
principle and certain of their decisions may be selected and 
reported by specialist journals; otherwise only a few 
produce annual reports.
(9) Ombudsmen enjoy a relationship with their 
authorities/industry which enables them to offer advice 
and exhortation as to standards and practice and to enter 
into a dialogue from time to time as to decision making; 
they may also feel it proper to 'blow the whistle' to 
regulators, etc. Tribunals do not.
( 1 0) Ombudsmen dispense 'palm tree' justice. Or, as the British 
and Irish Ombudsman Association puts it:
'Tne sAou/d".
Z!e required" fo ma^e reasoned" decisions in accordance wifA wAat is 
Jair in a/7 tAe circumstances, AaWng regard* fo principles o/ /aw, fo 
good" practice and" to any ine^uitaA/e conduct or 
maladministration.' (para. 3(e), sch. 1, Criteria).
This has been recognised judicially, apparently with 
approval:
' ... fAe puAAc do not Aave fo use fAe OmAudsman. Tney can 
instead" sue insurers in fAe courts. J^tAeygo Aejore tAe 
OmAudsman, Aecause Ae is not Amifed" fo pure/}' /ega/ 
considerations, in many cases tAeir prospects o^ success wi// Ae 
Aetter. Jut tAey Aaye fAe cAoice o^jorum. likewise, jor insurers, 
a/fAouaA fAcrc are fAe advantages o^ .Bureau memAersAip fo wAicA 
7 Aave referred", memfbersAip is not oA/igdtory. Tnose wAo cAoose fo 
Ae memAers run a greater ris^ o^an adverse decision i^comp/ainf is 
made fo fAe OmAudsman rAan i^fAe case were d'ecid'ed' in fAe 
courts Ay reference fo sfricf/y /ega/ princip/es. 7nisjo//ows^rom tAe 
OmAudsman 's terms o^re^rence wAicA expressA/ confemp/afe 
decisions more javouraA/e fo comp/ainanfs fAan fAe /aw wou/J 
pronJe. ' (per Rose LJ in A t /nsurance OmAudsman ex p. /legon 
li/e Assurance limited" [1995] LRLR 101 at pp. 105-6)
Nevertheless, this satisfactory situation may still not be 
beyond challenge. In relation to substantially similar 
arbitration agreements, Scrutton LJ famously asserted:
Vn my Weir fo a//on Eng/isA citizens fo agree to exc/ud"e fAis 
sa/eguard^jrom rAe administration o^ fAe /aw /i.e. appea/ fo fAe 
courts on questions oj /awj is contrary to puA/ic po/icy. Tnere 
must Ae no A/safia in Eng/and" wAere tAe King's writ d"oes not 
run. /f seems <^uife c/ear tAar no /SrifisA Court wou/d" recognise or 
enforce an agreement oy^ritisA citizens not to raise a de/ence o^ 
i//ega/ity Ay BritisA /aw. ' (CzamiAow y AotA, .ScAmidV dnd" Co 
[1922] 2 KB 478 at p.
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Now statute has rescued arbitrators from the courts 
by providing that the parties to an arbitration can agree 
that their disputes arc to be decided in accordance with 
'equity clauses' (s. 46(1 )(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996); 
this should also exclude any right of appeal to the courts 
on any question of law (see s. 69(1) of the 1996 Act). In 
stark contrast to arbitrators, if not to ombudsmen, 
tribunals must always apply legal rules and be subject to 
appeal on points of law (see s. 1 1 of the Tribuna/s and 
Enquiries Act 1992; as to judicial review of a tribunal 
which had erred in law, see e.g. Anisminic ltd v Abrei^n 
Compensation Commission No 2 [1969] 2 AC 147, also A v 
/Wancbester Supplementary Renejifs Appea/ Tribunal ex p. Ai7ey 
[1979] 1 WLR426).
(11) Ombudsmen's decisions mav not be legally binding on
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either side, usually because they are merely unenforceable 
recommendations (as with the Parliamentary and Local 
Authority Ombudsmen) but also because there may be the 
escape route of a 'publicity option' (as with the Banking, 
Building Society and Legal Services Ombudsmen). More 
satisfactory for consumer complainants, an ombudsman's 
decisions may be made binding only on the respondent, 
i.e. the industry side (as with the insurance and personal 
investment authority ombudsmen). Compliance in 
practice and enforceability at law are different questions. 
Tribunals' decisions will bind all the parties, subject to any 
appeal.
(12) Ombudsmen's decisions generally are not subject to appeal 
to the courts although if public sector, not private 
contractual, they may be susceptible to judicial re\iew (cf. 
A v /nsurance Ombudsman ex parte Aeaon ii/e Assurance limited 
above). Tribunals' decisions will be subject to appeal on 
point of law and/or judicially reviewable.
These dozen points of comparison, albeit generalised and far 
from exhaustive, may suffice to demonstrate distinctions of 
substance between ombudsman schemes and tribunal systems 
which are not justifiable in principle, given their similar raisons 
d'etre. So far as the contest is concerned, in my judgment it is a 
comfortable win on points for ombudsmen! And this seems to 
be a judgment that is extra-judicially supported.
Lord Wz)olf 's Report on Access to Justice ( 1 996) included three 
nearly relevant recommendations:
'296. Tbe retai/ sector snou/d be encouraged to deve/op private 
ombudsman scbemes to cover consumer comp/aints simi/ar to fbose 
wbicb now exist in re/ation to service industries; tne government sbou/d 
/aci/itate tnis. (7M 6 j)
297. Tne reYafionsbip between ombudsmen and tne courts snouJd be 
broadened, enab/in^ issues to be referred by tne ombudsman to fne 
courts and tne courts to tne ombudsman wifn tne consent oj fnose 
invoAed. (YRR 64)
Quite consistently, his lordship's foreword to the "A  Z of 
Ombudsmen' (NCC 1997) began: 'In both public and private 
sectors, 'ombudsmania' should be rampant.' Obviously no 
'ombosceptic' he concluded that foreword by saying:
'C/earA/, fbere is ^reaf scope to expand bofb fbe numbers and ro/e oj 
Ombudsmen, ^uf ^rowfb must ^/o band in band ivifb ^ua/ify confro7s. 
Tnat is wb} / commend fbe ej^orts (^ tne Rrifisn and /risb Ombudsman 
Association to set criteria jor ombudsman scbemes, and to identi^ and 
snare ^ood practice. '
This echoes the words of the Franks Committee, 40 years ago:
'/2& T^rbaps fbe most striAina^eature o^fribuna/s is fbeir variety, 
not on/y oj^unction but a7so o^ procedure and constitution, /f is no 
doubt ri^nt tnat bodies estab/isned to adjudicate on parficu/ar 
c/asses o^case snou/d be specia//y designed fo^uT^V tneir particu/ar 
junctions and snouYd tberejore vary wideTy in character. Eut tne wide 
variations in procedure and constitution wbicb now exist are mucb 
more fbe result o^ad boc decisions, po/ifica/ circumstance and 
bistoricaJ accident tnan o^ tne appYication o^^eneraY and consistent 
principles. M^ fbinA tbaf fbere sbou/d be a standing body, tbe 
adnce oj wnicn ivouJd be sou^/bf wbenever if was proposed to 
estab/isn a new type o^tribuna/ and wnicn wou/d a/so Aeep under 
review fbe constitution and procedure o^ existing tribunals. '
Thus, the Council on Tribunals was created. One conclusion, 
perhaps not altogether inescapable, is that the Council and the 
Association should get their acts together: ombudsman schemes 
and tribunal systems should not be separated by semantics but 
co-ordinated in substance.
But is the Pensions Ombudsman an ombudsman or a wolf in 
sheep's clothing? The recent Review o^Civi/ Justice and Ae^a/ Aid (a 
report to the Lord Chancellor by Sir Peter Middleton GCB, 
September 1997) included (at annex C.8):
'A number o^ private-sector ombudsmen, mosf/y covering fbe jinancia/ 
service industries, nave a7so been esfab/isbed. Some o^tbem are backed 
by statute. Tne main di^erence is tnat tbe decisions o^private-secfor 
ombudsmen are binding on fbe institutions fbaf bave joined fbe scbeme. 
Tnese scnemes are tnerejore anaJoaous to a Aind o^ one-sided 
arbitration, [/niaue/y, tbe decisions o^tbe Pensions Ombudsman, wbicb 
is a statutory scneme, are binding on botb parties, ft is fberejore 
fanfomoufif fo a court ..., and bas been criticised by fbe Cbunci/ on 
Tribuna/sjor bein^ a one-man tribunal ' (emphasis added)
Interestingly, if not ironically, the present chairman ot the 
Council on Tribunals is none other than Lord Newton of 
Braintree, 'aka' Tony Newton, Minister primarily responsible for 
the creation of a Pensions Ombudsman in preference to a 
tribunal.
Tnis arfic/e wi// be continued in fne next issue oj Amicus Curiae 
2000;. @
298. Tne discretion o^ tbe pub/ic ombudsmen to investigate issues 
invo/vin^ ma/administration wbicb cou/d be raised bejore tne courts 
snou/d be extended. (7RA 6 i)
The report makes no recommendations whatsoever about 
tribunals.
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